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INDUSTRY IN CRISIS: A PROGRESS REPORT ON VICTIM
COMPENSATION AND THE AIRLINES AFTER THE
SEPTEMBER 11TH LEGISLATION
RAYMOND L.

MARiANI*

I.

INTRODUCTION

M

ORE THAN ONE year has passed since the most deadly
attack ever carried out on American soil. The aviation
community and the rest of the nation may never fully reconcile
how terrorist attacks converted four passenger aircraft into missiles that destroyed national icons, killed thousands of our citizens, and cast a bright light on the vulnerability of our aviation
system. Nonetheless, the more tangible parts of our national
aviation system and the targets of the terrorist attacks are in reconstruction. Airports have reopened for flights. The Pentagon
has been rebuilt. The creation of new office buildings in conjunction with a memorial will be underway soon at the World
Trade Center site.
For most people, daily routines now more closely resemble
the day before September 11, 2001 than the day after. The same
cannot be said, however, for the two groups most directly affected by the terrorist attacks. The victims' families and the aviation industry are both struggling to recover financially and in
other respects.
The Government stepped in within a week of the terrorist attacks in an attempt to mend the economic damage. It created
two distinct but related programs: the September 11th Victim
Compensation Fund of 2001 ("the Fund") to compensate the
victims' families who, in exchange, would not sue and possibly
bankrupt the airlines, and a corresponding piece of legislation
that would give a financial boost to the airlines in the form of a
* B.S., 1984, Boston University, Journalism. J.D., 1987, Georgetown University
Law Center. The author practices in New York as litigation counsel to
manufacturers, airlines, airports and other corporations in the aviation industry.
The views are solely those of the author.
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grant/loan program ("the Airline Assistance Program").' Congress never clarified the legal or historical justification for these
related programs, apart from a general desire of all Americans
to aid those most directly affected by the terrorist attacks.2 The
lack of an articulated legislative rationale has come to haunt
both programs, as those left to run them must rely on their own
interpretation of the statutes for guidance or choose to steer the
programs according to their own philosophies under the guise
of divining legislative intent.
Both programs have been a source of divisiveness since inception. With respect to the Fund, debate continues among the
public at large over why these victims deserve compensation of
any kind from the Government.3 Questions persist about why
these victims deserve treatment different from those killed in
other terrorist attacks, or those killed by non-hostile events.4
The morality and equity of awarding differing amounts to victims' families based on the relative economic position of each
decedent also continues to generate controversy.' Finally, the
claimants themselves argue against a de facto damage cap instituted by the Special Master of the Fund. The single largest employer of victims threatened to commence litigation on that
issue if necessary,6 a promise fulfilled by a group of those families in a proposed class action.7
Distribution of money allocated by the Airline Assistance Program has been overshadowed by concerns of the government
board responsible for that process, and the electorate, over
spending taxpayer money on a government "bailout" for already
ailing companies. Most companies turned down have been
I Air Transportation System and Stabilization Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-42,
115 Stat. 230 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.) [hereinafter "System Stabilization Act"].
2 See Holman W.Jenkins, Jr., How Much Do We Owe The 9-11 Victims, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 25, 2002, at A15.
3 See Philip K. Howard, Facing The Limits of Law, and of Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 21, 2002, at A15.
4 See Emily Bazelon, Equal Pay for Equal Death, Slate, available at http://slate.
MSN.com/id/2067575/ (July 1, 2002).
5 See id.; Jenkins, supra note 2.
6 See Submission of Cantor Fitzgerald, L.P., Espeed, Inc. and Tradespark L.P.
to the Special Master of the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001
and to the United States Department of Justice, Cantor Fitzgerald, available at
www.cantorfitzgerald.com/vcf/DOJsubmission.pdf (Sept. 12, 2002) [hereinafter
"Cantor Fitzgerald Report"].
7 Colaio v. Feinberg, 262 F. Supp. 2d (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
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smaller, low cost carriers.8 They accuse the Air Transportation
Stabilization Board (ATSB) of relying on an outdated view of
regulation and competition by favoring larger carriers for loan
guarantees, and ignoring the consumers' priority on pricing
over service. The ATSB has cloaked its deliberations in secrecy
and explained its decisions with little more than a few cryptic
9
sentences in rejection letters to these small carriers.
Any sympathy that these corporations may have engendered
from the public was coincidentally destroyed by a realization last
year about what has been happening in the CFO's offices of the
biggest publicly held corporations in America. Many corporate
officers who claimed credit for incredible increases in revenues
and shareholder value in the 1990's were unmasked in 2002 as
simply well-heeled confidence men. This scandal over corporate mismanagement and fiscal manipulation has not implicated
any air carriers. Nonetheless, the atmosphere of distrust and
disgust by a nation of investors over corporate greed and irresponsibility, regrettably for the airlines, coincided with the timing of their applications to the ATSB.
Members of Congress and the President, who already defended themselves for enacting the legislation, guarded against
voters at the midterm elections in November 2002, making
them pay a price for propping up corporations that constituents
consider unworthy of taxpayer subsidies. The ATSB members,
all Presidential (i.e. political) appointees, are not unmindful of
these issues. These political variables continue to chill the atmosphere surrounding assistance to the airline industry.
Nor has either program been very successful, if they are indeed desirable. More than one year after the Special Master of
the Fund began accepting applications, only 398 families out of
3,000 of the deceased estates, as well as the injured, have ac10
cepted a proposed damage award from the Fund. Few families
have actually received a check. Meanwhile, some claimants
choose the alternative path of litigation, with that option retainLetters of denial from Daniel G. Montgomery, Executive Director, Air Transportation Stabilization Board [hereinafter "ATSB"] to Scott Dickson, Chairman,
President, and Chief Executive Officer, Vanguard Airlines, Inc., Frontier Flying
Services, Jacob Schorr, President and Chief Executive Officer, Spirit Airlines, and
8

Michael Conway, President, National Airlines, available at www.ustreas.gov/atsb
[hereinafter "ATSB"] (last visited June 20, 2003).
9 Id.
10 September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, Table I General Award Statistics, Dept. of Justice, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/
payment (last visited July 1, 2003).
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ing appeal as the Fund is battered in the press and by the victims' families themselves."
All of the major air carriers posted staggering losses for the
year 2002, despite the Airline Assistance Program. USAirways
and Vanguard filed for bankruptcy. 12 The United Airlines bankruptcy watch was a daily event 3 until it finally capitulated on
December 9th. 14 Yes, the Government offered to support loan
applications with its guarantee, but at a cost few carriers can afford. Only two of the Big Six carriers even applied for assistance." Of the sixteen carriers that did apply, more than half

were turned down. 16

This article follows one published last year, which described
in detail the creation and operation of the Fund and the Airline
Assistance Program. 7 Here, the two programs are revisited
more than one year after enactment. This article assesses the
relative success and failure of each program, the viability of alternatives, and the results we can expect for the victims and the
aviation industry as the programs continue to conclusion.
II.

THE VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND REVISITED
A.

CONGRESS CREATES THE ANTI-LAwsUIT

Within two weeks of the terrorist attacks, the U.S. created the
Fund as an alternative to lawsuits for the almost 3,000 families of
the deceased and the families of the injured.' 8 In theory, the
Fund would provide prompt benefits, using a simple process
with "fair and just" awards. 19 The Attorney General selected a
II James Grimaldi, After a Respectful Pause, Lawyers Line Up to Sue, WASHINGTON
POST, Sept. 9, 2002,
12 Edward Wong,

at E01.
Vanguard Airlines Filesfor Bankruptcy and Suspends Service, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 31, 2002, at C2; Press Release, USAirways, USAirways to Complete
Restructuring Plan in Chapter 11 Reorganization, available at http://www.usair.
com/about/press/nw 02_0811.htm (last visited June 20, 2003).
13 E.g., Edward Wong, Bankruptcy Hint by United Airlines, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15,
2002, at Al.
14 Press Release, United, UAL Corp. Files for Chapter 11 Reorganization (Dec.
9, 2002) available at http://www.ual.com/pressreleases [hereinafter United
Bankruptcy].
15 ATSB, supra note 8.
16 Id.
17 Raymond

L. Mariani, The September lth Victim CompensationFund of 2001 and
the Protection of the Airline Industry: A Billfor the American People, 67J. AIR L. & COM.
141 (2002).
18 System Stabilization Act, supra note 1.
19 September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 28 C.F.R. § 104 (West 2003).
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veteran mediator, Kenneth Feinberg, as Special Master of the
Fund. The Fund opened for business on December 21, 2001.20
The program had momentum and offered a fresh alternative to
the drawn out lawsuits that inevitably followed past aviation-related terrorist attacks, such as the decade-long Pan Am-Lockerbie bombing lawsuit against Libya.
After several months of delay and struggling, however, the
Fund was no longer attractive to claimants. The Special Master
became, by various accounts, a scapegoat for Congress' decision
to deduct collateral sources, a saint for his patience, a ministerial servant wrongly trying to assume "prime ministerial" responsibilities, and a lightning rod for criticism that anyone chooses
to direct at the Fund. 2' The position has become roughly akin
to Mayor of New York: after a very short honeymoon period, it is
a thankless task in which even the best intentioned and most
skilled diplomat will rarely please more than a small minority of
his constituents at any given time.
The Rules that define the process for awards were not finalized until several months into 2002.2 These Rules, the place
where legislative theory meets the reality of victims and their
losses, continue to be the subject of disappointment, anger, frustration, and all other emotions that surface anytime wrongful
death claims arise. Instead of being viewed as a source of predictability, the Rules have become the embodiment of a process
that claimants criticize as excessively inflexible and dogmatic.
The Fund has been hampered in other respects. Many claimants do not appreciate, or refuse to accept, that the Fund will
not compensate them in a manner similar to a traditional lawsuit. Each claim involves reaching a total dollar value for damages that would be "fair" to the claimant considering the factual
circumstances of the loss. But unlike the usual courtroom dispute, the issue of compensation for these 3,000 deaths has not
been limited to a defendant and its insurance adjuster. Instead,
another 300 million taxpaying citizens have provided continuous input as underwriters of the Fund.
The public debate over the Fund did not simply end when the
Final Rule ("the Rule") was published in March 2002. Commen20 Id.

See David W. Chen, Worst-Hit Firm Faults Fairness of Sept. 11 Aid, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 17, 2002, at Al, B10.
22 September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, Final Rule, 67 Fed. Reg.
11233 (Mar. 13, 2002) (codified at 28 C.F.R. § 104).
21
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tators continued to challenge the Fund in general, the concept
of wage-based awards and the choices that are seemingly impossible to make without offending some constituency. These discussions typically devolve into class warfare: "The Government
thinks the death of your electrician husband counts for less than
the death of someone else's stockbroker wife.

' 23

Others con-

tinue to launch vitriolic attacks against the victims, in caustic
and blunt affronts on their supposed greed.2 4 One reply to an
article on the Fund stated simply, "I'm sure everyone has lost
someone
in their lifetime. Should they get compensation,
25
too?"

Meanwhile, the claimants have not abandoned hope, amid
this hostile environment, of enhancing the available benefits.
One victim's spouse started a website that seeks to scrap the
Rule as it relates to collateral source deductions, and advocates a
minimum non-economic loss award of one million dollars per
claimant. 26 Similarly, a bill to amend the Act was introduced in
2002, proposing that same relief 27 That bill was sent to commit28
tee and did not resurface in the 107th Congress.
To complicate things further for claimants, one person, the
Special Master, fulfills multiple roles for the Fund. He is the
surrogate defendant, scrutinizing damage submissions for exaggerations and overreaching. He is also the judge, making a determination of the award, based principally on the victim's past
wages and the corresponding table for economic loss calculation in the Rules. As judge, he has been very vocal about generally capping awards at about 3 million dollars, saying awards
above that cap would "rarely be appropriate. 21 9 Lastly, the Special Master has been the only visible advocate for claimants who
sign onto the Fund and waive their right to sue most defendants.
These different and conflicting roles of the Special Master
have created a dilemma as more awards are issued. When claim23

Bazelon, supra note 4.

24 See Comment to Bazelon, (July 3, 2002), supra note 4 (on file with author)

("Wake up you greedy bastards. This tragedy affects us all. Stand together because you all have the same grief, therefore share the proceeds on an equal
basis.").
25 See Comment to Bazelon, (July 3, 2002), supra note 4 (on file with author).
26 Fix the Fund, at www.fixthefund.org (Dec. 8, 2002); see David Chen, supra
note 21, at B10.
27 Terrorist Victim Compensation Fund Equity Act, H.R. 3665, 107th Cong.
(2002).
28 Id.
29 September

11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, supra note 19, at 66, 274-75.
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ants express dissatisfaction with awards, they are essentially expressing dissatisfaction with the Special Master. Yet this is the
same person, the only person, trying to encourage more claimants to pick the Fund as their best chance of obtaining a fair
award. Might the Fund benefit from someone other than, or in
addition to, the Special Master serving as a spokesperson who
tries to attract new claimants to seek an award from the Fund?
B.

CLAIMANTS BEGIN TO CHOOSE

As ofJuly 2003, just over 2,000 families had submitted an eligibility form to the Fund."° By making that filing, they waived
their right to sue any airline, airport or aircraft manufacturer.
The first awards by the Fund were not issued until late July and
early August of 2002.1' Only 624 families have received notices.
of award from the Fund. 2 As of July 2003, 398 of the 624 families have accepted the awards. 3 One hundred families requested a hearing. 4 The remaining families had not decided
how to proceed. 5
For those families who eagerly awaited the first group of
awards for an indication of how their own claim might be valued, the information released was not very enlightening. The
Fund lists the average amount of the awards after collateral offsets ($1.49 million), and the median award after offsets ($1.23
million) . 6 The Fund also posts a range of awards for four income levels: victims who received income of less than $50,000
(award range of $250,000 - $2.7 million); income between
$50,000 and $100,000 (award range of $250,000 - $4.1 million);
income between $100,000 and $200,000 (award range of
$250,000 - $4.5 million); and income over $200,000 (award
30 September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, Table 1 General Award Statistics, supra note 10.
31 Daniel Wise, First Victims'Fund Letters Expected, 228 N.Y.L.J. 1 (July 22, 2002);
Jess Bravin, First 25 Awards to Survivors Made By Sept. 11 Fund, WALL ST. J., Aug. 23,
2002, at A4.
32 September 11th Victims CompensationFund of 2001, Table 1 General Award Statistics, supra note 10.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id.

36 Id. at Table 2, Range of Award Values for Cases Relating to Deceased
Victims.
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range of $250,000 to $6.0 million).37 Each award is listed separately by dollar amount within each range. 8
This data, however, is of little assistance in calculating or even
estimating any prospective awards. The Fund declines to state
the number of children or other dependents of each decedent.
Moreover, the collateral offsets are not disclosed. The Fund
website admits as much: "Readers should understand that collateral source offsets vary greatly among claimants and can account
for substantial differences in awards from what appear to be similarly situated claimants." 9 These awards could have been millions of dollars higher but may have been reduced for life
insurance benefits or other offsets. The information released
offers insufficient guidance for families that might otherwise
choose the Fund over a lawsuit.
The attorneys representing a group of 14 "test cases" stated
that awards issued to their clients averaged 75 percent more
than would have been expected pursuant to straight application
of the published tables. 4' However, only one of the 14 claims
involved a person earning in excess of $100,000 per year.4 1 The
absence of any claims in that test group where income exceeded
the 98th percentile ($231,000) perpetuated skepticism among
the families of victims in that income range as to whether the
Fund would cap awards at $3 to $4 million, as stated by the Special Master when the Rules were issued.42 The reporting of
awards up to $6 million has partially dispelled that concern.
The only details of a claimant's background information and
underlying financial data in conjunction with an award are anecdotal. For example, voluntary disclosure was made by the par43
ents of a victim who was single, with no children in his 20'S.
He was earning almost $60,000 per year and was awarded $1.19
million, with a deduction of $150,000 for offsets resulting in an
award of $1.04 million. 44 The award was separated into non-economic loss and economic loss.45
37

Id.

38

Id.

39 Id.
40 Daniel Wise, In 14 Test Cases, Sept. 11 Fund Master Gives 'FairCompensation' to
Families, 228 N.Y.L.J. 1 (Sept. 2002).
41 Id.

Id.
43 David Chen, Family Accepts $1.04 Million Award from 9/11 Victims Compensation
42

Fund, N.Y.L.J. Aug 8, 2002, at A20.
44 Id.

45 Id.
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If this decedent was a New York resident, the award would
exceed any verdict under New York law. With no persons economically dependent on this victim, New York law would severely limit any remaining damages for a wrongful death
lawsuit.4 6 In contrast, the Fund's standard non-economic loss
award is $250,000 for each victim.4 7 This indicates that the
award included $940,000 in economic loss. A lawsuit might have
provided half of that $1.15 million, perhaps even less.
This is the type of comparative analysis that potential claimants should be able to conduct to determine whether to file with
the Fund. If the Special Master succeeds in inducing hundreds
of additional claimants to apply for an award from the Fund,
versus joining the consolidated lawsuits against airlines, airports,
and security companies, may depend in large measure on his
policies for disseminating information about the awards to date.

C.

THE LAWSUIT OPTION: MoRE THAN AN
ATTRACTIVE NuISANCE

Over 100 claimants have opted out of the Fund by filing lawsuits against the entities protected by the Act.4 8 Most lawsuits
name United Airlines and American Airlines as well as companies hired for security functions at the airports where the terrorists boarded the four aircraft used in the terrorist attacks as
defendants.4 9 Some cases also name numerous other airlines as
defendants on the theory that they shared responsibility for hiring competent checkpoint security at the airports where the terrorists were screened for weapons.5 0 The government entities
that own airports related to the terrorist attacks have also been
sued. 51 Dulles Airport in Virginia, Logan Airport in Boston, and
the Portland, Maine Airport have all been named as defendants
46 See, e.g., Abruzzo v. City of N.Y., 649 N.Y.S.2d 172, 173 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996)
(reducing verdict from $1.2 Million to $150,000 for single decedent with no financial dependents).

47 28 C.F.R. § 104.44 (West 2002).
48 E.g., Mariani v. United Air Lines, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 11628 (S.D.N.Y. filed Dec.
20, 2001) (first filed case).
49 E.g., Koutny v. United Air Lines, Inc., No. 02 Civ. 2802 (S.D.N.Y. filed Apr.

10, 2002).
50 E.g., Driscoll v. Continental Airlines, No. 02 Civ. 7912 (S.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 3,
2002).
51 E.g., Jane Doe v. City of Portland, No. 02 Civ. 7153 (S.D.N.Y. filed Sept. 9,
2002).
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in lawsuits
by victims' families. 52 Some parties have also sued
53
Boeing.
These cases are consolidated before Judge Alvin Hellerstein
in the Southern District of New York, the venue required by the
Act for all matters related to the terrorist attacks. Discovery in
these consolidated cases has progressed slowly. First, the United
States objected to any non-party discovery. The information demanded would raise national security issues, according to lawyers for the Government, and could endanger public safety and
law enforcement efforts if disclosed. The Government moved to
intervene in the cases in July 2002. 5"
Lawyers for some families that have neither sued nor filed a
claim with the Fund appeared before Judge Hellerstein in July
2002. 55 They asked him to keep the cases at a slow pace so they
could join lawsuits once their clients decide which avenue they
will choose for recovery. The struggle over disclosure of government data concerning airport security and terrorist threats
("SSI" sensitive security information) has made it unnecessary
for Judge Hellerstein to intentionally slow the pace of discovery
in deference to the undecided claimants.
The court stayed all discovery as a result of the Government's
intervention and directed the Government to submit briefs on
the issue. A hearing in September 2002 indicated that the number of claimants who had filed suit had reached a critical mass
that required a more systematic approach to discovery. The
court ordered the parties to create plaintiff and defense steering
committees and then submit proposed discovery plans.56
The one year anniversary date of the terrorist attacks created
a difficult choice for victims' families who are considering filing
suit. The Fund allows them to file a claim until December 21,
2003. 57 However, New York law requires them to file a lawsuit
58
against the Port Authority within one year of an alleged tort.

The Port Authority owned and operated the World Trade
Center as well as Newark Airport, the departure point for the
52 E.g., id; Ambrose v. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth., No. 02 Civ. 7150 (S.D.N.Y.
filed Sept. 9, 2002).
53 E.g., Lyles v. Boeing Co., No. 02 Civ. 7243 (S.D.N.Y. filed Sept. 10, 2002).
54 Benjamin Weiser, Ruling Favors Limited Access to 9/11 Data, N.Y. TIMES, July
13, 2002, at B1.
55 Id.
56 Doe

v. Am. Airlines, No. 02 Civ. 452 (S.D.N.Y. filed Sept. 20, 2002).

57 System Stabilization Act, supra note 1, § 405 (a) (3).
58

N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW, § 7107 (McKinney 2002).
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flight that crashed near Shanksville, Pennsylvania. By filing suit
against the Port Authority, these families would forego their
right to file a claim with the Fund.5 9
Four families, on behalf of all others similarly situated, moved
by order to show cause before Judge Hellerstein for an extension of time to file a claim against the Port Authority until September 10, 2004.60 The Port Authority, despite having many of
its own personnel among the ranks of the victims, opposed the
motion. 6 1 The court denied the motion, holding that it did not
have power to override the statute. 62 However, the court fashioned a remedy that resolved this dilemma favorably for the
claimants. Judge Hellerstein held that the court will automatically suspend suits filed by claimants who file against the Port
Authority.6 3 The Port Authority did not need to file an answer
or responsive motion.6 4 The judge allowed each claimant to decide before December 21, 2003 whether to file a claim with the
Fund or pursue a lawsuit against the Port Authority. 65 Once a
claim is filed with the Fund, the lawsuit against the Port Author66
ity must be dismissed within ten days.
The court advised the parties in November that it would entertain motions to dismiss by February 7, 2003. American Airlines moved to dismiss the claims by all victims other than the
passengers and crew on the four aircraft, which would dismiss
most claims. A number of security companies and non-carrier
airlines joined in the American brief. The motion is based on a
lack of duty owed to those victims in the WTC and on the
ground for checkpoint security. State law played a prominent
role in the American motion because the System Stabilization
Act specifically references state law as applicable to the extent
that it does not conflict with federal law.
The airports filed a separate joint motion to dismiss as to all
claimants on two bases. First, the airports allege that they owe
no duty to any person for checkpoint security, a function specifically and exclusively reserved to the airlines under the federal
59 System Stabilization Act, supra note 1, § 405 (c) (3) (B) (i).

Mulligan v. Port Auth., No. 02 Civ. 6885 (S.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 29, 2002).
Id. (referring to Affidavit and Memorandum of Law of the Port Authority,
Sept. 3, 2002).
62 Id. (referring to Order dated Sept. 6, 2002, perJ. Helerstein).
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id.
60

61
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aviation regulations. Second, the airports moved to dismiss
claims for any other aspect of airport security on the basis that
the plaintiffs do not allege a cause of action under federal regulations, the only possible source of a duty owed to them. The
Portland Airport moved to dismiss on the separate basis that the
plaintiffs did not comply with a Maine statute requiring a timely
notice of claim to be filed.
The court granted the Portland Airport motion based on the
claim statute.67 No plaintiff appealed the ruling. The airports'
motions were otherwise denied as they concern checkpoint security pending some limited discovery. The airline/security
company motions to dismiss remain pending.
Noticeably absent to date from the list of defendants in virtually all cases is the United States Government.68 The only theory
to support a claim 'against the Government would involve alleging breach of a duty to prevent the terrorist attacks through intelligence services and the military. The initial response of the
Government after the attacks was a refusal to acknowledge any
lapse in intelligence that would otherwise have resulted in
preventing the attacks.69
The tenor of those comments changed dramatically, particularly for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), in mid-2002.
A field agent received whistle blower protection from Congress
after stating that, prior to the terrorist attacks, she was blocked
by senior FBI officials from obtaining a search warrant for the
computer and other belongings of Zacarias Moussaoui, who has
been charged with conspiring with the 19 terrorists killed in the
terrorist attacks. 1T The FBI changed its response to the growing
inquiry into its actions, from claiming a few days after the attack
that "there were no warning signs," to admitting in May that it
across some
cannot rule out the "possibility we could have come
71
lead that would have led us to the hijackers.

67 In Re Sept. 11 Litigation, No. 21 MC 97, 2003 WL 21212180 (AKH) (S.D.N.Y.
May 21, 2003) (perJ. Hellerstein).
68 But see Schroeder v. FAA, No. 02 Civ. 7185 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2002).
69 See FBI Director's Comments, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2002 (Sept. 17 - "There were
no warning signs that I'm aware of that would indicate this type of operation in
the country.").
70 David Johnston, FBI Inaction Blurred Picture Before Sept. 11, THE JOURNAL
NEWS, May 27, 2002, at Al.
71 See FBI Director's Comments, supra note 69.
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A Senate investigation resulted in a harshly critical report of
the FBI.7 2 One senator who co-authored the report stated that,
had the FBI assimilated the information from its field offices
before September 11, it would have resulted in a "veritable
blueprint for 9/11."' The report cited the Moussaoui matter as
well as the FBI ignoring a Phoenix agent's concerns over many
young Arab men seeking flight training in the United States. 4
The release of this and other information known to law enforcement before the terrorist attacks resulted in the passing of
legislation to create an independent commission to investigate
errors by the Government prior to September 11. 75 The White
House opposed the commission,76 but ultimately agreed. The
Commission has been proceeding with testimony and
hearings.77
These concessions by some FBI officials, however, would not
firmly support a lawsuit against the Government by victims' families. A substantial portion of the intelligence community has
rejected this analysis and asserted that the few scraps of information about terrorist activities related to aviation were too disparate among the massive quantity of incoming data.78
Establishing liability of the Government would also require
plaintiffs to prove more than simple negligence, the standard of
care in the lawsuits against the airlines and security companies.
Instead, they would need to jump the more significant hurdle of
the discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims
79

Act.

Plaintiffs would have great difficulty proving that government
intelligence officers abused their discretion in the manner that
they decided to collect, organize, review, and interpret data on
72

Philip Shenon, Senate Report on Pre-9/11 Failures Tells of Bungling at FBI, N.Y.
28, 2002, at A14.

TIMES, Aug.
73 Id.

Id.
75Allison Mitchell, House Votes for Independent Inquiry on Intelligence Agencies Actions on Sept. 11, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2002, at Al8; David Firestone, 9/11 Inquiry
Approved, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2002, at Al.
76 David Firestone, Homeland Security Fight Returns to Fore, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16,
2002, at Al.
77 See generally National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, available at www.9-11
commission.gov/hearings (last visited July 1, 2003).
78 David Johnston, Former FBI Director Faults Lawmakers on Terror Fight, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 9, 2002, at Al.
79 28 U.S.C.A. § 2680(a) (West Supp. 2003); 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346(b) (West
Supp. 2003).
74
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potential terrorist activities. Without clear guidelines to use as a
benchmark for government handling of the information, a
claim by plaintiffs would amount to no more than second-guessing these officials because few former intelligence officials can
be expected to testify against their colleagues. This type of
claim is also incompatible with the lawsuits now pending that
allege negligent airport security, making it less attractive because the cases might not be consolidated.
D.

THE SILENT MAJORITY

And what of the remaining potential claimants? The largest
category of victims' families is the undecided group. More than
half-way into the filing period for the Fund, only one-third of all
victims families have chosen either to file with the Fund or file
suit. Approximately 2,000 families, not counting more of the
injured, are watching and waiting. They have only a few months
remaining to decide.
The dissatisfaction over the de facto damages cap instituted by
the Special Master remains a big sticking point for high income
claimants. The single largest group of victims, the employees of
the Cantor Fitzgerald firm, recently raised this problem to a new
level of visibility.8 0 The review of statistics concerning their
losses is sobering. Of 1,000 people employed by the firm, twothirds were killed in the attack." Not a single employee present
in their offices on floors 101-105 survived. 2 Over 700 children
lost a parent. s Twenty families lost multiple family members.8 4
Against this backdrop of horrific loss arose the potential for the
first serious challenge to the Fund.
A report issued by the General Counsel of Cantor Fitzgerald
to the Special Master and Department of Justice ("the Report")
confronted the ceiling on recovery that the Special Master created through the Final Rule." The Report directly challenged
the capping of awards at the 98th percentile of wage earnings as
a contravention to the legislation that created the Fund and the
will of Congress.86 The Report pointedly cited cases that con80

Cantor Fitzgerald Report, supra note 6.

s

Id. at 15.
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Id.
Id.
Id.
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Id. at 37.
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strain the limited authority of an administrative officer to
change the mandate provided by enabling legislation. 7
The Report suggested that Cantor Fitzgerald families might
launch a collateral attack on the Fund through judicial review
pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), if their
concerns were not met by the Special Master. Comparing the
Fund to an "agency" as defined by the APA, the Report stated
that "an administrative agency lacks the power to issue regulations that 'effect an impermissible alteration of the statutory
framework.' "188 The Report asserted that an aggrieved party can
therefore file a declaratory judgment lawsuit that seeks to invali89
date the regulation and may seek injunctive relief as well. The

proposed legal challenge by Cantor Fitzgerald was underscored
by a separate statement that such a dispute is ripe for review if
the issue is purely legal and delay would directly affect the
claimants.9"
The threat became reality in a lawsuit filed by five Cantor famThey named the Special
ilies as a proposed class action.
Master Kenneth Feinberg, John Ashcroft and the Department of
Justice as defendants. The complaint did not seek to invalidate
the Fund. Instead, plaintiffs challenged the amounts of the
awards as inconsistent and contravening the System Stabilization
Act. They quoted numerous Feinberg statements and claimed
that he improperly influenced his decision with concerns over
how much the Treasury should pay out and how much claimants
actually need to put their life back together from his personal
perspective. The plaintiffs also claimed that the Rules he created perpetuate this invalid scheme and must be stricken as conTwo other lawsuits joined in the
trary to the enabling statute.
92
challenge to the Fund.
Success for these plaintiffs would have dealt a serious blow to
the Fund. The Cantor Fitzgerald families alone constitute approximately 20 percent of all claimants. The claimants who
have already accepted awards could have challenged the
amounts of their awards if the challenge were successful and the
Rules had to be changed. With the pace of awards to date disap87

Id. at

88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id.

30.

at 31 n.16.

91 Colaio v. Feinberg, 262 F. Supp. 2d (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
92 Smith v. Feinberg, No. 03 Civ. 1040 (AKH)(S.D.N.Y. 2003); Schneider v.
Feinberg, No. 03 Civ. 129 (AKH) (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
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pointing many of these families, the prospect of more delays created by revisiting earlier awards would be the last thing the Fund
needed for publicity.
Judge Hellerstein issued a single comprehensive order that rejected all challenges to the Fund." He held that Congress invested the Special Master with substantial discretion over a
scheme for compensation. Additionally, Congress was entitled
to delegate to him such discretion intending that he would provide less to claimants than they would otherwise receive in a trial
by jury. No plaintiff has appealed the ruling.
Apart from the size of awards, claimants may also be reluctant
to choose the Fund for other reasons. First, a claimant family
must initially complete the application to the Fund, which runs
30 pages. It is well organized, but nonetheless intimidating for
someone who is not a lawyer, accountant, or other professional
accustomed to similar compilations of data. One claimant who
is an accountant expressed frustration with the red tape. 4
Second, many claimants have retained counsel who may guide
them away from the Fund. An attorney hired on a contingency
basis could make more money through a lawsuit, because of potential for higher damage awards. Some attorneys might also
prefer a lawsuit because of the publicity such high profile cases
bring to a plaintiffs firm. A number of firms will likely represent most of their clients by filing claims with the Fund, guarantying contingency fees to counsel, and then representing
some claimants in lawsuits.
The slow payout of charitable donations is another factor that
has delayed claimants' decisions about choosing the Fund. Several major charities that collected donations still had close to
one billion dollars to disperse as of June 2002." 5 Those claimants who believe that the Fund might be insufficient to replace a
lost income stream would benefit from knowing the total compensation from other sources before deciding whether to file a
lawsuit. Claimants should be able to make that calculation with
application to the Fund by December 2003. It would be surprising if virtually all charitable donations had not been distributed
two years after collection.
93 In re September 11 Litigation, Order of May 8, 2003 (per J. Hellerstein),
available at www.nysd.uscourts.gov/Septl 1Litigation.htm.
94 David Chen, Many Relatives, Wary and Anguished, Shun Sept. 11 Fund, N.Y.
TIMES, June 11, 2002, at B1.
95 Stephanie Strom, Families Fret as CharitiesHold a Billion Dollars in 9/11 Aid,
N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2002, at Al.
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Finally, many claimants who are foreign nationals would experience additional obstacles to obtaining a prompt award. Laws
concerning distribution of an award raise concerns because of
common law marriages recognized in other countries but not by
New York, income taxes levied on awards unlike the exemption9 6
in the United States, multiple residences, and other issues.
Some have inquired whether they can sue an entity in the home
country of the decedent without waiving the right to an award
under the Fund, a point not addressed by the legislation.97
E.

LAWSUITS COMPATIBLE WITH THE FUND

The Fund does not require a claimant to forego all lawsuits in
exchange for the Government awarding damages. Claimants
must give up their right to sue airlines, manufacturers, airports
and similar potentially culpable parties who would face liability
for negligence.98 The Act specifically permits claimants to maintain lawsuits against terrorists and their conspirators who perpetrated the terrorist attacks. 9 9

A group of approximately 75 victims' families filed suit on August 15, 2002, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.1 0 0 The suit names almost 100 defendants, including
I°
banks, Islamic foundations, and the government of Sudan. '
The plaintiffs seek to satisfy anyjudgment through assets held by
the defendants in the United States. 0 2 A similar suit was filed in
the same court against Osama Bin Laden, the Republics of Iran
and Iraq, and numerous other defendants.1 0 3 Cases were filed
4
in Pennsylvania federal court as well as Florida federal court. 0
At least ten lawsuits by numerous plaintiffs against hundreds
of defendants accused of perpetrating or conspiring to arrange
the terrorist attacks have also been filed in the U.S. District
96 David W. Chen, Struggling to Sort Out 9/11 Aid to Foreigners, N.Y. TIMES, June
27, 2002, at Al.

97 Id.

98 System Stabilization Act, supra note 1, § 405 (c) (3) (B) (i).
99 Id.
100 Burnett v. Al Baraka Inv. & Dev. Corp., No. 02 Civ. 1616 (D.D.C. filed Aug.
15, 2002); Sept. 11 Families Sue Saudis, Islamic Groups, 228 N.Y.LJ. 1, 4 (Aug. 16,
2002).
101 Sept. 11 Families Sue Saudis, Islamic Groups, 228 N.Y.L.J. 1, 4 (Aug. 16, 2002).
102 Id.
103 Havlish v. Bin Laden, No. 02 Civ. 305 (D.D.C. filed Feb. 19, 2002).
104 Malik v. Bin Laden, No. 01 Civ. 758 (E.D. Pa. filed Sept. 19, 2001); Pitchford v. Bin Laden, No. 01 Civ. 1405 (S.D. Fla. filed Oct. 15, 2001).
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Court for the Southern District of New York. °5 These cases are
proceeding separately from the cases filed against the airlines,
security companies, and airports.
III.

THE AIRLINE COMPENSATION FUND
A.

EAGER TO LEND A HAND?

The Government's stated intention of helping an ailing airline industry by instituting a loan program appears less successful than its efforts concerning the victims of the terrorist attacks.
Airlines face the opposite problem with the Fund: very eager
applicants, but few that qualified for an award. Sixteen air carriers lined up for what each believed is a just portion of the $10
billion available from the program. 10 6 Four carriers were approved and have closed on a government guaranteed loan,
three more were conditionally approved, and seven were denied
07
assistance. 1
The loan program follows a series of government subsidies
that were also a part of the Act. After the Government handed
out $5 billion in grants based on revenues prior to the terrorist
attacks, air carriers were justifiably optimistic on receiving additional funding from the private markets via a government guarantee on loans. What many of those carriers did not expect
were government terms that one commentator characterized as
no better than "what the local loan shark might have offered."'10 8
Before the program could consider most of the applicants,
Congress was already prepared to cut back on funding. The
Senate Appropriations Committee voted to cut the Airline Assistance Program from $10 billion to $4 billion. 0 9 The full Senate
rejected the measure after vigorous lobbying by USAirways. 1 10
The very act of trying to scale back the program, however, sent a
message to applicants about their likelihood of success.
Comments by the former ATSB Executive Director about the
state of the industry explain why many carriers criticize the
ATSB for lacking insight into their needs. He stated, upon re105 E.g., Burlingame v. Al Qaeda Islamic Army, (S.D.N.Y. filed Sept. 10, 2002).
106 ATSB, supra note

8.

107 Id.

108 HolmanJenkins, How About Letting Airlines Help Themselves, WALL ST.J., Aug.
21, 2002, at A13.
109 Susan Carey, Airline Loan Board Isn't Afraid to Say No, WALL ST. J., June 26,
2002, at DI.
110 Id.; see also Richard W. Stevenson, Right Stufffor an Airline Loan: PoliticalPull,
N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2002, at Al.
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signing his position in April 2002, that the recovery of the airline industry "has been more rapid than expected." '' He also
believed that "capital markets had reopened" and that the ATSB
had already "achieved its goals of stabilizing the airline
industry."' 12
In reality, most carriers cannot survive the daily losses and the
consequential draws on cash. USAirways filed for voluntary
bankruptcy on August 12, 2002.1ll United Airlines stated on August 14 that it could file for bankruptcy by November 2002.1"4
That prediction came true when it filed for Chapter 11 protection on December 9, 2002.'15 The ability of one carrier to actu-

ally turn a profit in 2002 carried such significance that it
merited a front cover story for a leading weekly business
periodical. "6
B.

MANY ARE CALLED, FEW ARE CHOSEN

The deadline for applications to the Airline Assistance Program was June 28, 2002.117 Seven of the sixteen applications
were filed on the last day. 11 8 The following carriers applied to
the program for a guarantee in an amount representing ninety
percent of the total loan the carrier sought to secure and received the following disposition:

11 Press Release, Brera Capital Partners, Director of Government Airline Loan
Board Resigns, Airline monitor weekly.com confirms (Apr. 30, 2002), available at
http://www.brera.com/news/news23.html.
112 Id.

113 Stephen Labaton, US May Be Best Recast as Financier of Recovering Airlines,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2002, at Cl.
114 Wong, supra note 12, at Al.
115 United Bankrupcty, supra note 14.

116 Forbes, Jet Blue - Airlines Lose Billions. This One's in the Black. What's the Secret?, Oct. 14, 2002; Melanie Wells, Lord of the Skies, FORBES, Oct. 14, 2002, at 130.
117 Air Transportation System Stabilization, 14 C.F.R. § 1300.16 (2001).
118 ATSB, supra note 8.
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United Air Lines
USAirways
America West
Evergreen Int'l Airlines
American Trans Air
Frontier Airlines
Spirit Airlines
National Airlines
Aloha Airlines
World Airways
Ozark d/b/a Great Plains
MEDjet International
Corporate Airlines
Vanguard Airlines
Frontier Flying Service
Gemini Air

$1.8 billion
$900 million
$377 million
$148.5 million
$148 million
$63 million
$54 million
$50.5 million
$40.5 million
$27 million
$17 million
$7.7 million
$7 million
$7.2 million
$7.2 million
$7 million

[68

denied
approved
approved/closed
approved
approved/closed
approved/closed
denied
denied
approved/closed
approved
denied
denied
denied
denied
denied
denied 11 9

Some carriers, including American Airlines, Northwest, and
Continental did not seek a loan guarantee. Despite that decision, they expressed their displeasure with the Government's
role in providing an advantage for competing carriers through a
guarantee from the program. The president of Northwest Airlines accused the Government of "playing God" by shaping the
industry for the future.120 Northwest had almost $3 billion in
cash at mid-year 2002, making it eligible for private capital and
therefore, ineligible for an ATSB guarantee. 2 1 Continental's
CEO similarly opposed a loan to United Airlines. 1 22 Those airlines that did apply were also quick to express similar criticism
once they were rejected, one complaining that the ATSB is
"picking winners and losers.' 1 23 With excess capacity a clear
source of present industry losses, each carrier would benefit
from the failure of one of its brethren, particularly if the likes of
a giant, such as United, fell victim permanently to the post-September 11 doldrums and could not recover after bankruptcy.
America West was the first loan application approved, after
numerous concessions by the airline, most notably the granting
of an equity stake to the Government. 124 Even with the conces119Id.

Carey, supra note 109.
Id.
122 See Susan Carey, United Faces Hurdlesfor Loan Guarantee, WALL ST.J. EuR.,
Aug. 12, 2002, at Al ("If United gets the loan, then we and others could be
dead.").
123 Leslie Miller, Associated Press, Small Airlines Criticize Loan Board, Silicon Valley.com, Aug. 21, 2002.
124 ATSB, supra note 8.
120
121
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sions, the vote was 2-1.125 The other carriers approved and with
are Frontier Airlines, American Trans Air, and
loans closed
12 6

Aloha.

Those carriers close to obtaining government-backed financ1 27
ing are USAirways, Evergreen Airlines and World Airways.
The ATSB letter to USAirways arrived just a few weeks before its
bankruptcy filing.128 The loan approval was contingent on concessions from unions, more and better priced warrants for the
Government, and better collateral. 129 The ATSB issued a second
letter immediately after the USAirways bankruptcy, confirming
its commitment to guarantee the USAirways loan, despite its financial condition. i 0 Evergreen's request for $148.5 million was
it was required to make
cut to a maximum of $90 million and
3
other changes to its business plan.1 '
Denials of applications by eight other carriers have overshadowed the approvals. 32 Vanguard received the first denial. Although it revised its application several times, the Board
ultimately denied the application on unanimous vote. 133 In a
letter to the carrier, the Board cited its failure to turn a profit in
125 ATSB Press Release, No. PO 890, Air Transportation Stabilization Board
Conditionally Approves Application by America West (Dec. 28, 2001) available at
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/po890.htm.
126 ATSB Press Release, No. PO 3638, ATSB Issues Federal Guarantee on Behalf of American Trans Air (Nov. 20, 2002) available at http://xvw.ustreas.gov/
press/releases/po3638.htm; ASTB Press Release, No. PO 3717, ATSB Issues Federal Guarantee on Behalf of Aloha Airlines (Dec. 23, 2002) available at http://
www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/po3717.htm.
127 ATSB Press Release, No. PO 3598, ATSB Conditionally Approves Application by Frontier Airlines, Inc. (Nov. 5, 2002) available at http://avw.ustreas.gov/
press/releases/po3598.htm; ATSB Press Release, No. JS-218, ATSB Conditionally
Approves Application by World Airways, Inc. (Apr. 23, 2003) available at http://
www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/js218.htm; ASTB Press Release, No. PO 3713,
ATSB Decision on Evergreen International Airlines, Inc. (Dec. 20, 2002) available
at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/po3713.htm.
128 ATSB Press Release, Letter to US Airways, Inc. (July 10, 2002) available at
http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/domestic-finance/atsb/press/index.html.
129 Id.
130 ATSB Press Release, ATSB's Statement on US Airways' Plan for Chapter 11
Reorganization, No. PO 3342 (Aug. 12, 2002) available at http://wvw.ustreas.
gov/press/releases/po3342.htm; ATSB Meeting Minutes (May 21, 2002) [hereinafter "ATSB Minutes"], available at http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/domestic-finance/atsb/minutes/minutes-05-31-02.pdf.
131 ATSB Press Release, ATSB Decision on Evergreen International Airlines
7
(Dec. 20, 2002) available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/po3 13.htm.
132 ATSB, supra note 8.
'33 ATSB Press Release, No. PO 32941, Letter to Vanguard Airlines (July 29,
2002) available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/po32941.pdf.
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any single year since inception in 1994.134 The Board concluded

that based on its application, Vanguard needed an additional
infusion of capital apart from the loan, but that equity never
materialized.1 3 5 The Board stated that Vanguard's hiring of a
brokerage house to raise the equity was insufficient because that
firm promised no direct funding itself.'3 6 Vanguard filed for
17
bankruptcy within days of receiving the ASTB rejection.
The Frontier Flying Service application was unanimously rejected in part on the basis that the airline was not affected financially by the terrorist attack.'3 3 This has been a key factor for the
ATSB in order to avoid certain criticism that the program is a
bailout for losses that airlines experienced before the terrorist
attacks. Frontier Flying apparently cited an increase in its insurance rates as a further justification for the loan. The ATSB denied the guarantee on the basis that Frontier Flying
1 39
experienced minimal increases in its insurance premiums.
The Spirit Airlines application was rejected on a 2-1 vote, with
Department of Transportation representative Kirk Van Tine dissenting.14 ° The rejection cited the carrier's solvency, stating that
it provided no "reasonable reassurance" of repayment.' 4' Spirit
Airlines challenged the ATSB's understanding of the industry
and its supposed disfavor of low cost, low fare carriers. 42 Another corporate officer of Spirit described the ATSB process as
"kind of a mystery.'

43

He claimed that his airline had a better

rating than America West on the ATSB rating system but was
134

Id.

135

Id.
Id.

136

Edward Wong, Vanguard Airlines Filesfor Bankruptcy and Suspends Service, N.Y.
July 31, 2002, at C2.
138ATSB Minutes, supra note 130; ATSB Press Release, No. PO 3141, ATSB Decision on Frontier Flying Service, Inc. (May 31, 2002), available at http://www.
ustreas.gov/press/releases/po3l41 .htm.
137

TIMES,

139

Id.

ATSB Press Release, No. PO 3354, ATSB Decision on Spirit Airlines (Aug.
15, 2002) available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/po3354.htm; ATSB
Press Release, Letter to Sprit Airlines (Aug. 14, 2002) available at http://www.
ustreas.gov/offices/domestic-finance/atsb/press/spiritdecision-ltr.pdfbttp://
www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/po3354.htm.
141 Id.
142 Miller, supra note 123.
143 Hubble Smith, NationalAirlines: Loan Denial Baffling to Supporters, LAS VEGAS
REv. J., Aug. 10, 2002, at www.lvrj.com/business.
140

20031

VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND

275

declined by the "beancounters" at the Board.' 4 4 A request for
14 5
reconsideration was denied by the same 2-1 vote.
National Airlines was turned away unanimously on similar
grounds. 14 6 The ATSB concluded that National was not necessary to a "safe, efficient and viable commercial aviation system"
because of low-cost competition available in the markets it services. 1 4 7 It also stated that National's proposed business plan
posed "an unacceptable risk" to the48 Government, with insufficient amounts and forms of equity.
National issued a lengthy press release that accused the ATSB
of refusing to thoroughly and fairly consider its application,
holding outdated and ill-founded views of criteria to use for a
healthy airline, and maintaining a bias against small carriers. 149
In a blistering attack by on the ATSB, National's CEO accused it
of being biased against National because it is the principal competitor of America West.' 50 The Government holds an equity
stake in America West as a condition of its loan guarantee. National further attacked the ATSB for bias because it hired a division of General Electric as a consultant to project revenues of
applicants.' 5 ' GE is also a creditor of America West as well as
USAirways, another approved applicant.
National also complained formally to the Department of Justice in a July 26, 2002 letter that America West violated its own
business plan by increasing service into Las Vegas by 50% but
only by 5% in other markets. 52 Supporters of National Airlines
in the Nevada Congressional delegation were harshly critical of
the ATSB. One referred to the ATSB as a "little three member
board" with a mind to "run people out of business" by denying
applications. 153 Another accused the Board of bias and criti144

Id.

145 ATSB Press Release, Spirit Airlines Request for Reconsideration (Oct. 17,

2002) available at http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/domestic-finance/atsb/press/
spirit-appeal-denial_101702.pdf.
146 ATSB Press Release, No. PO 3353, ATSB Decision on National Airlines
(Aug. 15, 2002) available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/po3353.htm.
147

Id.

148

Id.

149 Transportnews.com (Aug. 14, 2002) available at www.transportnews.com.
150

Id.

151 Id.
152

Id.

153

Smith, supra note 143.
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cized its failure to explain the standards it employs for review of
applications. "'
Denials also were issued for Corporate Airlines, MedJet, Great
Plains and Gemini Air. 1 55 The Board's letters were not specific
other, citing poor credit risks and
and differed little from each
1 56
excessive expansion plans.

These denials were the undercard for the real attraction, the
bout between the ATSB and United Airlines. The days leading
up to the decision devolved from lobbying efforts by competitors into personal attacks by other airlines on United managers
and their business strategies. One commentator noted that lobbying is commonplace, but "I don't think I have ever seen it be
so close to a blood sport."'15 7 Continental's Chief Executive officer was not shy about voicing his hopes for the worst: "This is
survival for us. This is not a game. This is not a boys' club. All
of us are dying. United isn't too big to fail. They'll just make a
bigger hole when they hit the ground."1 58 Even European airlines chose to pile on, expressing their hope that the thinning of
competitors through market forces would help the industry. 59
A November 6 letter from the ATSB seeking more information
from United foreshadowed the Board's decision one month
60

later. 1

The decision by the ATSB was a two vote denial, with the DOT
representative, General Counsel Kirk Van Tine postponing his
vote pending further information
154

'61 The letter of denial was

Id.

55 ATSB Press Release, No. PO 3654, ATSB Decision on MEDjet International,

Inc. (Nov. 26, 2002) available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/po3654.
htm; ATSB Press Release, No. PO 3655, ATSB Decision on Corporate Airlines
(Nov. 26, 2002) available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/po3655.htm.
156Letter from ATSB to MEDjet International (Nov. 26, 2002), available at
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/po36541.pdf; Letter from ATSB
to Great Plains (Dec. 20, 2002) available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/greatplains.pdf; Letter from ATSB to Gemini (June 2, 2003) available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/geminiletter.doc; ATSB,
supra note 8.
157 Micheiline Maynard, United's Rivals Press a Struggle of Rare Ferocity, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 4, 2002, at Cl.
158 Id.
159 Suzanne Kapner, European Airlines See Threat in Aid to United, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 4, 2002, at C8.
160 Letter from ATSB to United Airlines (Nov. 6, 2002) available at http://www.
ustreas.gov/press/releases/po3604.htm.
161 ATSB Press Release, No. 3670, ATSB's Decision on United Airlines' Proposal for a Federal Loan Guarantee (Dec. 4, 2002) available at http://www.ustreas.
gov/press/releases/po3670.htm.
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more detailed than others, predicting a liquidity crisis despite
any loan, and unrealistic forecasts of short term revenues that
are contrary to industry analysts and not mindful of low-cost
competitors. 16 2 The two members also cited high costs of operating, an under funded pension plan and insufficient collateral.
In an unusual gesture, they also issued separate press releases to
justify their actions, the Chairman graciously expressing his reluctance where the United employees would be affected while
Treasury Secretary Fisher took one last shot at United, charac'
terizing its business plan as "fundamentally flawed."163
The reaction was jarring, even for an airline that knew denial
was a strong possibility. One flight attendant described the feeling as "absolutely devastating.116 4 It was all the more frustrating

for workers that own a majority of the company stock, after conceding more in wages and other compensation over the prior
several months in an effort to present the ATSB with a healthy
business plan. The Speaker of the U.S. House, representing
United's home city of Chicago, had personally lobbied and was
described as "obviously disappointed" by his spokesman. 6 5 Despite a plan to cut up to $5.2 billion in costs over five years, the
Board would not agree, and was described as "irresponsible" by
one union leader.' 66 Bankruptcy followed within days.
Although those denied aid are quite critical, others not so
close to the situation do not agree. "They're being very stingy
with taxpayer-guaranteed dollars, and that's what we wanted,"
concludes Representative John Mica, Chairman of the House
Transportation Committee's Subcommittee on Aviation.' 6 7
"We're perpetuating dinosaurs if we approve loans for pre-9/11
problems" concludes one commentator. 6 '
C.

SURVIVING ANOTHER COLD WINTER

Airlines have been hit with additional costs resulting from the
terrorist attacks, apart from lost revenue. Delta's Chief Execu162 Letter from ATSB to United Airlines (Dec. 4, 2002) available at http://www.
ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/unitedltrl .pdf.
163 Press Release, Federal Reserve, Statements of Edward Gramlich and Peter
Fisher (Dec. 4, 2002) available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/po3670.
htm.
164 David Barboza, Daily FrustrationsGrowfor United's Workers, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5,
2002, at CL.
165 A.P., U.S. Panel ReJects Plea by United, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2002, at C6.
166 Id.
167

Smith, supra note 143.
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tive Officer stated in testimony to the House Subcommittee on
Aviation of the Transportation Committee that forty percent of
the industry's estimated $7.5 billion loss in 2002 would be a direct result of higher security and insurance costs.169 Delta's terrorism insurance increased from $2 million to $150 million
170
dollars, and cockpit door reinforcement cost $20 million.
occupying
Cargo restrictions, a security tax, and air marshals
171
revenue seats have all added costs to operations.
The state of the industry is bleak indeed, particularly for the
former giants of air travel. Losses incurred in 2002, shown below, cannot be repeated in 2003 without the complete collapse
of some carriers:
American Airlines
United Airlines
Delta

-

$3.5 billion
$3.2 billion
$1.3 billion

US Airways

-

$1.65 billion

Continental
Northwest

-

$451 million 1 7 2
$798 million

In the words of United's own chairman to his shareholders,
the results for 2002 were "abysmal and unsustainable.' 73
As a result of these costs, the airlines have requested additional aid from the Government. The White House is very unlikely

to support any

"direct assistance."'1 74

The Aviation

Subcommittee's Chairman John Mica summarized the mood in
Congress: "Let me say quite firmly at this point: there will be no
government bailout.

'1 75

Any further aid will therefore consist of

Yochi J. Dreazen, Legislators Lend Ears, Not Funds to Airlines Seeking Financial
Aid, WALL ST. J., Sept. 25, 2002, at A6.
169

170
171

Id.
Id.

172 American Airlines Press Release, AMR Reports Fourth Quarter Loss of $529
Million, (Jan. 22, 2003) available at http://www.amrcorp.com/newsreleases.html;
United Airlines Press Release, UAL Corp. Reports Fourth-Quarter and Full Year
Financial Results (Jan. 31, 2003) available at http://www.ual.com/press/detail/0,
1442,50605-1,00.htmi; Delta Airlines Press Release (Jan. 16, 2003) available at
www.delta.com; USAirways Press Release, US Airways Group Reports Year-End
Results (Feb. 3, 2003) available at www.usair.com/about/press/nw -03 0203.htm;
Continental Airlines Press Release, Continental Airlines Will Boost Seat Capacity
in Hawaii 31% (Jan. 15, 2003) available at www.contintental.com; Northwest
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amounts too small to make a significant impact on a carrier's
balance sheet.
The ripples through the industry continue to cause lost jobs,
lower wages, and other instability. American Airlines announced 7,000 job cuts in August 2002.176 Delta decided to cut
another 7,000 people in October, meaning a 25 percent reduction in workforce since the terrorist attacks. 177 Northwest Airlines plans to cut 1,600 flight attendants through attrition or
layoffs. 7 The five unions of United Airlines had offered $1 billion in concessions per year for five years, 179 but it was not sufficient for the ATSB to grant its loan guarantee application.
The first quarter of 2003 was simply another disappointment
to begin a new year of losses. American Airlines declared a loss
of one billion dollars, described by its president as "truly dread1
ful" performance. 8 0 Delta reported a loss of $466 million.1 8
Northwest lost $396 million, 18 2 and Continental lost $221 million.18 3 United lost $1.3 billion despite cuts of up to 1,250
jobs. 184
The red ink has not been limited to air carriers. GE Aircraft
Engines announced plans to cut 1,000jobs in 2002 and between
1,200 and 1,800 jobs in 2003.185 The manufacturer attributed
the lost revenue to airlines grounding jets and to the shortage of
available funds to purchase new equipment. 186 The Chief Executive of the division said a recovery may not happen until
176 Edward Wong, American Airlines to Cut Jobs, Planes and Flights, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 14, 2002, at C1.
177 A.P., Delta Air Lines to Cut Up to 8,000 MoreJobs, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2002, at

C4.

178 A.P., Northwest Plans to Cut About 1,600 Flight Attendants, N.Y.
2002, at C6.
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Oct. 3,

179 Edward Wong, United Air's Unions Offer Plan to Save a Billion a Year, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 26, 2002, at C2.
180American Airlines Press Release, AMR Reports First-Quarter Loss of $1.04
Billion (Apr. 23, 2003) available at http://www.amrcorp.com/newsreleases.html.
181 Delta Airlines News Release (Apr. 17, 2003) available at www.delta.com.
182 Northwest Airlines Press Release (Apr. 16, 2003) available at www.nwa.com.
183 Continental Airlines Press Release, Continental Airlines Bucks Industry
Trend and Reports 24th Consecutive Profitable Quarter (Apr. 15, 2003) available
at www.continental.com.
184 Edward Wong, United Airlines Plans to Cut $1.4 Billion in Operationsand 1,250
Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2002, at C6; United Airlines Press Release, UAL Corp.
Reports First-Quarter Results (May 2, 2003) available at http://www.ual.com/

press/detail/0,1442,50964-1,00.html.
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A.P., GE Aircraft Engine Division Plans Layoffs, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2002, at C4.
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2005.187 Boeing announced declining revenues against 2001
figures, due to the severe downturn in aircraft sales.1 8 It has
already cut 30,000 workers.8 9
Those working at airports also have felt the pinch of declining
revenues and fewer flights. The two New York City airports, LaGuardia and JFK International, employ 40,000 workers. 190 Traffic was down 12 percent at LaGuardia in June 2002 versus June
2001, and was down 29 percent atJFK over that same period.19 '
Newark experienced a 16 percent drop in the same time period. 92 Los Angeles lost 19 percent of its flights, and Boston's
Logan Airport lost a hefty 23 percent of its traffic.' 9 3 The ten
busiest airports have been more fortunate, with a traffic decrease of only 6 percent on average.' 94
IV.

MOVING PAST SEPTEMBER 11TH

Despite the impact on thousands of families of the victims and
the airline industry, all of those affected by the terrorist attacks
are trying to move on, some faster than others. The lawsuits
filed by some victims' families likely will continue for years, exploring airline security and government warnings before the terrorist attacks. Some airlines which are named as defendants
may no longer exist when the cases reach their conclusion. The
airlines will fall victim to the costs of September 11, the decrease
in revenues, failure to obtain loans, the pre-September 11 doldrums of the economy, or some combination of these and other
factors.
A.

IF

You

FUND IT, THEY WILL COME

As the potential claimants must choose between the Fund and
lawsuits in late 2003, the number of applicants should dramatically increase. If the Fund does not sign up at least 2000 of the
potential claimants for decedents' families, it will be considered
a failure by most, particularly those who become the targets of
187
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the lawsuits filed by the remaining claimants. Any less would
mean that a majority or close to it found the concept unacceptable due to inadequate awards, lack of predictability or other
reasons.
The de facto damage cap of the Fund is regrettable to the
extent that it stifles the ability of claimants to argue for a damage award that they believe is justified, under the enabling legislation that created the Fund. Despite that shortcoming, the
Fund remains the best choice for most claimants. Like the democratic system that was one of the targets pursued in vain by the
terrorist attacks, the Fund remains the best of several imperfect
alternatives available. Victims might have earned income, after
consumption and reduction to present value, many times more
than the $6 million that the Special Master has to date issued as
a maximum award. But the next option, a lawsuit with difficult
liability theories against companies with capped exposure, is far
less certain. The Fund may appear slow, but lawsuits will take far
longer to reach a judgment.
Some claimants may be attracted to a lawsuit for the potential
of a very large award and the notion of assigning fault to vindicate the deceased. However, there is not much that claimants
can do financially to punish an industry that has already been
devastated. Recovery is limited to insurance policy limits for all
but the security companies. The lawsuits will not prove a point
to the public or the industry because there is no liability mystery
to solve or behavior to deter. Without the ability to place Osama
Bin Laden in the dock, the lawsuits have opted for substituting
United Airlines, American Airlines and other non-terrorist organizations as defendants.
B.

SURVIVING DESPITE THE

ATSB

Air carriers have few choices remaining other than survival of
the fittest. Most have cut costs by layoffs and reduced passenger
amenities. The larger carriers have parked some aircraft to reduce maintenance costs and allow flexibility of flights with fungible aircraft. Flights have been cut back to reduce capacity.
Aircraft purchases have been delayed.
Despite these efforts, the next year will likely bring change to
the ranks of the larger carriers. Without a dramatic increase in
travel, excess capacity will continue because of the number of
competitors. This is healthy for consumers, but not so promising for carriers. The union contracts and other constraints on
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these big carriers make it difficult for them to cut costs further,
although they continue to lose money daily.
The only other relief for air carriers may come in the form of
a more relaxed view of consolidation from the Antitrust Division
of the Department of Justice and other government agencies.
United's attempt to merge with USAirways in 2001 was rejected
as excessively anti-competitive by governments regulators. It announced a code sharing arrangement in 2002. Delta, Continental and Northwest agreed to a similar arrangement. Some
commentators call for a more relaxed view of airline consolidation, believing that the number of carriers will not dwindle to
just a handful in the present marketplace.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Victim Compensation Fund will likely attract the majority
of potential claimants, with dramatic increases in applications in
autumn 2003. Those who have chosen to file suit in lieu of the
Fund should not expect to proceed to trial and judgment for
several years due to complex issues over sensitive security information materials.
Most airlines will see little additional assistance from the Government through the ATSB or other government funding. The
severe downturn in revenues and the increased costs will continue through the end of 2003 and into 2004, hastening the process of some carriers that are experiencing severe financial
difficulty either merging or closing operations. Attrition will
likely become the greatest force in bolstering revenues of the
surviving carriers and ultimately returning them to profitability.

